Abstract :: The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three central ideas. The first is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. After elucidating those, I argue that the emerging picture of mental representation is satisfactory only as an account of mental representation at the sub-personal level. It is unsatisfactory, in a principled way, as an account of mental representation at the personal level.
Introduction
The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three central ideas. The first is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological.
The ontological tenet is that mental representation is a two-place relation holding between a representing state and a represented entity (object, event, state of affairs). The semantic tenet is that the relation in question is probably information-theoretic at heart, perhaps augmented teleologically, functionally, or teleo-functionally to cope with difficult cases. The methodological tenet is that mental representations are posited solely on third-person explanatory grounds.
In this paper, I argue that this picture of mental representation is satisfactory only as an account of mental representation at the sub-personal level. It is unsatisfactory, in a principled way, as an account of mental representation at the personal level.
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On Dretske's proposal, a neurophysiological event in the brain that has the function of carrying information about the fact that it is raining represents that fact. More generally, whenever a brain event A has the function of carrying information about B, A constitutes a mental representation of B. B then constitutes the representational content of A. The fact that it is raining is the representational content of the mental state constituted (or realized) by the neurophysiological event nomically dependent thereupon.
Note that this account of mental representation employs physical ingredients exclusively. A is a physical event in, or fact regarding, the subject's brain. B is an event or fact in the subject's physical environment. The relation between A and B is (in an appropriate sense) a physical relation. Hence the physicalistic promise of teleoinformational semantics: the promise to account for mental representation in purely physicalistic terms.
It is one thing to offer an analysis of mental representation, quite another to show that there actually are items in the world that satisfy the analysans. A crucial part of Dretske's overall theory is the attempt to show that mental representations, as conceived in teleo-informational semantics, must exist, because they play an indispensable explanatory role. The main idea is that Dretskean representations earn their explanatory keep as structuring causes of behavior. To understand what this means, we must understand what is meant by (a) "behavior" and (b) "structuring cause." (a). According to Dretske, a behavior, or a piece of behaving, is a bodily motion produced by a suitable internal state of the moving organism. Behavior is thus to be distinguished from sheer bodily movement. The same hand motion can serve (i) to waive hello or (ii) to chase a fly. The bodily motions are type-identical, but the behaviors typedifferent. The difference is due to the internal state that caused the relevant bodily motion. More radically, the same leg motion can be (i) the kicking of a chair or (ii) the result of a dog running into the leg. The former is a behavior, the latter is not. The difference is that the former was caused by an internal state (of the right sort), whereas the latter was not. The point is that what makes a given behavior the behavior it is, and behavior at all, is that its constituent bodily motion is caused by the right sort of internal state. uriah kriegel draft, comments welcome 5 (b). A structuring cause is a specific kind of cause of causal connection (a specific kind of second-order cause, if you will). Pressing 8 on my remote control causes my television to switch to Channel 8. Why? Because the TV guy hooked it up this way. The TV guy's actions caused pressing 8 to cause the TV's switching to Channel 8. They structured the causal connection between pressing 8 and switching to Channel 8. In this sense, they constitute the connection's structural cause. Someone could do a number on my remote control, hooking it up to the microwave instead. She could cause pressing 8 to cause the microwave to heat for 8 minutes, rather than cause the TV to switch to Channel 8. If she did, her actions would constitute the structuring cause of a causal connection between pressing 8 and heating for 8 minutes.
Such structuring causes of causal connections are to be distinguished from triggering causes of causal connections. If my friend yells at me that the halftime must be over and the game is back on Channel 8, whereupon I press 8 and the television switches to Channel 8, we might say that my friend's actions caused my actions to cause the television's switching to Channel 8. So it is true both of my friend's actions and the TV guy's actions that they caused the cause of the TV's switching to Channel 8. But the senses in which this is true are very different. My friend caused the causing of the effect by bringing about the cause of the effect, whereas the TV guy caused the causing of the effect by bringing about the relation between that cause and effect. Dretske flags that distinction by calling my friend's action the "triggering cause," and the TV guy's the "structuring cause," of the pressing's causing of the switching. The idea is that my friend's actions did not touch the causal relation between my pressing 8 and the TV's switching to 8 -they did not structure the causal connection. They merely triggered a preexisting causal connection.
Dretske's claim is that mental representations are the structuring causes of behaviors (and are such in virtue their representational content).
2 When I waive hello, my hand moves a certain way, M, and the cause of its movement is a certain internal state, S, say my mental representation of an acquaintance across the street. Recall that an internal state becomes a representation only when it is recruited to play a certain functional role in virtue of carrying the information it does. Part of S's functional role is to cause M (in the right circumstances), and S was recruited to play this aspect of its functional role in virtue 6 carrying the information that an acquaintance is across the street. So the fact that S causes M is caused by the fact that S carries the information that an acquaintance is across the street. The fact that S carries the information it does causes S to cause M. Specifically, it is the structuring cause of S's causing M. Since S's causing M constitutes the hellowaiving behavior, the fact that S carries the information it does can be said to be the structuring cause of that behavior.
It is by being the structuring causes of behavior that representational facts -facts qualifies as a mental representation iff there is a y, such that x bears the teleoinformational relation (the relation of having-the-function-of-carrying-information-about) to y.
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In this respect, teleo-informational semantics exemplifies a more general approach to mental representation. On this general approach, mental representation is a two-place relation between a representing entity and a represented entity. More precisely: 7 (2P) x is a mental representation iff there is a y, such that x bears the appropriate relation R to y.
On this scheme, R is clearly a two-place relation. The relevant relation of representation is the two-place relation "x represents y" or "x is a representation of y."
It might be objected to this characterization that it does not take into account the fact that teleo-informational semantics, and other theories of the same mold, are supposed to apply to cases of hallucinatory misrepresentation as well. 6 In such cases, there is no y such that x stands in R to y, and yet x qualifies as a mental representation.
This consideration is well placed, but it will not affect the argument of this paper.
So we can simply bypass it -in one of the two ways. The first is to forego the necessarycondition part of (2P), focusing on the fact that bearing the right two-place relation is certainly a sufficient condition for qualifying as mental representation:
(2Pa) x is a mental representation if there is a y, such that x bears the appropriate relation R to y.
The second is to restrict (2P) to veridical mental representations, thus eliminating hallucinatory cases from the scope of the claim:
(2Pb) x is a veridical mental representation iff there is a y, such that x bears the appropriate relation R to y.
(2Pa) deletes "only if" from (2P), making it a claim about sufficient conditions only.
(2Pb) adds "veridical" to (2P), making it a claim about veridical mental representations exclusively. For the sake of convenience, we may also formulate the thesis that incorporates both amendments:
(2Pc) x is a veridical mental representation if there is a y, such that x bears the appropriate relation R to y.
(2Pc) is an unquestionable commitment of extant theories of mental representation. And we can take commitment to (2Pc) as a litmus test for conforming to the ontological tenet of what I have called the mental representation orthodoxy. Dretske's theory thus exemplifies this ontological tenet. This is in addition to exemplifying -nay, being the chief exemplar of -the semantic tenet.
The theory also exemplifies the methodological tenet. To justify the postulation of mental representations, it seeks theoretical grounds on which to do so. That is, it attempts to identify a certain role for them to fulfill in a full objective theory of the world -a role nothing else could fulfill (at least not as well). This attempt might be cast in Quinean light, as the claim that the best theory of the world would (will) quantify over mental representations, therefore we should (will) be ontologically committed to them. 
The Personal and the Sub-Personal
One of the distinctions that have been most instrumental in the development and flourishing of the cognitive sciences is between cognition at the personal level and cognition at the sub-personal level. The distinction has been effectively operative in psychological research for about a century, but was drawn explicitly for the first time in
Dennett 1969. In this section, I consider a number of possible ways of drawing the distinction with greater precision, including my favored one.
The distinction is of course theoretical, and the terms in which it is drawn are technical terms. So the exercise cannot be one of offering an accurate conceptual analysis of the terms. It is also not an exercise in Dennett exegesis, since it is common that a philosopher grasp for an important distinction that another philosopher ends up articulating better. 10 The exercise is thus to articulate correctly the distinction which Dennett was grasping for. We get an informal handle on what that distinction is supposed to be by considering some paradigmatic examples (that is, ostensively).
When I calculate the tip I want to leave for a waiter, I deliberately and selfconsciously go through a certain process. The process is a cognitive process, and its product is a cognitive state. As such, both process and product are proper objects of the cognitive sciences. Processes and states of this type take place at the personal level: they are personal-level processes and states.
It was an insight of major foundational significance that the proper objects of These two considerations -and there are probably others -make it unwise, indeed arbitrary, to study cognition by investigating personal-level processes and states exclusively. Furthermore, once sub-personal cognitive processes and states are admitted, conceptually, it quickly becomes clear that, empirically, the personal-level states and processes are only the tip of the cognition iceberg. The bulk of our cognitive life occurs at the sub-personal level. Coming to terms with this fact is perhaps the most important precondition for the kind of fruitful approach to the study of cognition that modern cognitive science has been able to devise.
In the interest of foundational clarity, however, it is also important to have a more That is, the important contrast is not between something that I do and something that happens to me, but rather between something that I, the whole system, do and something that some subsystem in me does. The suggestion here is that a state or process is personal if it is a state or process of the overall system; it is sub-personal if it is a state or process of a subsystem. This suggestion has the advantage of elegantly mapping the personal/subpersonal onto the systemic/sub-systemic. It also applies equally well to states as to processes. Call this the systemic approach to the distinction.
11
A problem with the systemic approach is that the system/subsystem distinction is relative, whereas the distinction personal/sub-personal is not. Arguably, every system but one is also a subsystem, and every subsystem but a handful is also a system. More weakly, many systems are subsystems and vice versa. Thus, I am not only a system, I am also a subsystem of my department. Conversely, my visual system is, well, a system -not only a subsystem of me. Yet we do not wish to say that my tip calculation is a personal process of me but a sub-personal process of the university, nor that the computation in my visual system is a sub-personal process of me but a personal process of the system.
The suggestion might be modified in a way that overcomes this problems, by drawing the distinction as follows: a state or process is personal if it is a state or process of a system that constitutes a person; it is sub-personal if it is a state or process of a system that is a (proper) subsystem of a system that constitutes a person. This appears to have been Dennett's (1969) own take on the distinction.
There are two problems with the modified suggestion, however. First, it draws the personal/sub-personal distinction by explicit appeal to the person/non-person distinction.
While this may not render the suggestion entirely vacuous, it does leave it call into question its explicatory cash value. Secondly, and to my mind more importantly, the suggestion still returns wrong results. We can readily envisage a global sub-personal computational process in my brain involving, say, sensorimotor parallel processing across the entire system. Such sub-personal global processes are easy to make sense of, but are impossible on the suggestion under consideration: in virtue of being global, they take place in a system that constitutes a person, and are therefore personal by the suggestion's lights.
In search of a safer suggestion, we might ask ourselves what it is that is missing from the just described sub-personal global process that makes it sub-personal.
Intuitively, the fact that I have no idea it is taking place seems relevant. I am completely oblivious to the occurrence and unfolding of this process. We may even coherently suppose that the process is in principle inaccessible to me. This might suggest that the distinguishing feature of personal states and processes is that their subject is in some way, at least minimally, aware of them; sub-personal states and processes are those of which the subject is entirely unaware. On this suggestion, the key to the personal/sub-personal distinction is awareness. This would be to focus on the "self-consciously" part of the informal characterization of personal-level states and processes as occurring "deliberately and self-consciously." Call this the awareness approach to the personal/sub-personal distinction.
For the awareness approach to be at all workable, however, we must assume that awareness comes in degrees. You can be very aware of the fact that you are jealous of your wife's new friends or only dimly aware of that fact. The degree of awareness might be determined by, or at least correlate with, attention: you can be very attentively aware of your jealousy or relatively inattentively aware of it. The awareness approach would be extremely implausible if we required of personal-level states and processes a high degree of awareness. 12 However, on the assumption that awareness comes in degrees, we might require of personal-level states and processes only the most minimal degree of awareness -any awareness greater than zero, so to speak. The suggestion then becomes much more plausible. When I am engrossed in the calculation of the tip, I am not being particularly attentive to the process of calculation. I am mostly aware of the numbers I am
manipulating. Yet it would be a mistake to say that I am entirely unaware of the activity of calculating itself. I am aware of it, albeit only dimly and inattentively. It is not as though I have no idea that I am engaged in calculating, and the news that I am would surprise me as much as anyone.
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In addition, for the approach to be plausible the awareness of the personal state must be roughly simultaneous with that state. Future awareness of a mental state through memory clearly would not make the state a personal-level one.
The suggestion under consideration, then, is that a state or process is personal if its subject is simultaneously at least minimally aware of it; it is sub-personal if its subject is completely unaware of it. This suggestion returns the right results in all the cases we have considered thus far. The tip calculation is personal, and indeed I am minimally aware of it. My visual system's computation, leading to my seeing of the ashtray, is subpersonal, and indeed I am completely unaware of it (nor is my visual system aware of it, since my visual system is not the kind of thing that can be aware of anything). The seeing of the ashtray itself is personal, and indeed I am aware of it. The global parallel processing is sub-personal, and indeed I am unaware of it (as, again, is the global cognitive system that constitutes me).
The present suggestion is not without its problems, however. For one thing, there seem to be certain cases of absent-minded perception (as in the long-distance truck driver's perceptions of the road) that are certainly personal but of which the subject is, arguably, completely unaware. For another, the notion of awareness is not one of the 14 clearest in the philosophy of mind. The somewhat robust notion being availed of here, with its gradient structure and its minimal cases, may be thought particularly worrisome.
We might make some progress by turning the second problem against the first. Is it not possible that, although not remotely attentive to her perceptual states, the longdistance truck driver is nonetheless very dimly aware of them? We might hold, for instance, that the driver is minimally aware of such absent-minded perceptions, but they leave no mark on working memory (for whatever reason). Such claims are hard to assess, and this may augment our suspicion that the operative notion of awareness is obscure. Let me raise one brief consideration, though. Suppose that, through a cosmic incident, the driver becomes instantaneously color-blind during her trip. Plausibly, she would at that very instant notice the change in her perceptual experiences. Also plausibly, though much more controversially, she could not notice the change at that instant had she not been at least minimally aware of her perceptual experiences all along. It would follow that the driver was aware of her perceptual experience all along, albeit minimally.
14 Another objection is that the awareness approach returns the wrong results for standing states. Jane has the standing belief that there are more than four countries in the world. But until we draw her attention to it, she is completely unaware of it. Yet it is Jane, the person, who believes that there are more than four countries in the world, not any subsystem within her. Thus Jane's standing belief is in some sense a personal-level state of which she is completely unaware.
Personally, I am not so impressed by this objection, because I am independently inclined to reject the existence of standing states. Consider the view that there are no dispositional beliefs, only dispositions to believe. The idea is that there is no need to posit such dispositional beliefs, since dispositions to believe would be sufficient to do any explanatory work we might want dispositional beliefs to do -and do so more economically (see Manfredi 1993). On this view, Jane has the disposition to believe that there are more than four countries in the world, but it does not follow that there is a dispositional belief to that effect that she has. Thus we can, in fact, take this brief discussion of the consciousness approach to the personal/sub-personal distinction to provide further support for the awareness approach.
There is also the possibility that the notions of the personal and the sub-personal are cluster notions, in which all or most of the features considered above play some role or another. Thus, we might hold that prototypical personal-level states and processes are agentive states/processes of a global cognitive system that constitutes a person and of which the person is aware or conscious; and that non-prototypical personal-level states and processes are those that resemble the prototypical ones to a sufficient degree. Call this the cluster approach to the personal/sub-personal distinction.
This suggestion strikes me as ill-motivated in light of our discussion, however. A cluster view is called for when a number of competing suggestions seem to capture the spirit of what one is after, but happen to return wrong results at the margins. The problems we have raised for most of the above suggestions go to the heart of their plausibility as capturers of the target distinction's spirit. Moreover, the suggestions in question returned the wrong results not merely at the margins, in odd and artificially concocted cases. They returned the wrong results on straightforward core cases.
For these reasons, the awareness approach seems to me preferable to the cluster approach. Although admittedly imperfect, due mainly to an element of obscurity associated with the notion of awareness, the awareness approach appears to be the most plausible of the suggestions we have examined, in that the only case where it might be suspected of returning the wrong result (that of standing states) is a case that may not even be real. Principled considerations seem to support rather than undermine the awareness approach. In what follows, I will proceed with it as my working assumption about the personal/sub-personal divide. We may state it as follows: a mental state S (or process P) of a subject Z is a personal-level state (or process) just in case Z is at least simultaneously minimally aware of S (or P); S (or P) is a sub-personal state (or process) just in case Z is completely unaware of S (or P).
Mental Representation at the Personal Level
One way in which cognitive science has greatly benefited from the personal/sub-personal distinction is through the realization that even paradigmatically personal-level states, such as visual experiences, have sub-personal counterparts that can be just as cognitively potent, so to speak, and sometimes even more so.
Examples are by now legion, and they come from studies of subliminal perception, visual masking and priming, brain lesion, and more. A striking example emanates from the widely accepted hypothesis that the visual system has two computationally independent pathways, the dorsal stream and the ventral stream, both of which construct concurrent representations of the visible environment (Milner and ones.
Figure 1. The Ventral and Dorsal Streams in the Visual Cortex
This can be seen in cases of Gestalt-effect-induced visual illusions that do affect our personal-level visual experiences but do not infect the sub-personal representations that guide our actions on the fly. Thus, in the Titchener illusion, a circle appears bigger when surrounded by smaller circles than when surrounded by bigger ones (see Figure 2 overleaf). A normal subject presented with two equisized circles differently surrounded will perceive one to be bigger than the other. More cautiously, we should say that she will perceive one to be bigger than the other at the personal level. At the sub-personal level, however, the perceptual system represents the circles to be equisized. For as it turns out, when subjects are asked to reach for a coin, they do not adjust their grip aperture (measured by the distance between the thumb and the index finger) in response to surrounding coins. That is, their grip apertures are the same for differently surrounded equisized coins. This suggests that, at some point in the visual processing, some representations of the coins' size are formed that are not infected by the Titchener illusion, and moreover, that it is these representations that guide the reaching and grasping behavior. The going hypothesis is that they are dorsal-stream visual representations (Ibid.). These are not representations we are aware of at the personal level, however. They are sub-personal representations. 
The Ontological Tenet
Start with the ontology of representation. I will now argue that although personal-level representations may well be involve a two-place relation x represents y, and so orthodoxy is well-positioned to account for their ontology, personal-level representations involve the more complex three-place relation x represents y to z, where z ranges over persons. 21 I start with some observations of how natural and fruitful it is to conceive of personal-level representation in this way, then turn to a more formal argument.
A personal-level representation is generally a representation of something to someone -to a person, that is to say. As I have my experience my visual experience of the laptop before me, I am in an internal state that represents the laptop to me. As you read these words, you are in an internal state that represents these words to you.
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Now, when I look at a duck-rabbit figure, the figure represents to me both a duck a rabbit. Suppose, however, that Jane has suffered a duck-related childhood trauma that causes her to repress all incoming duck-related information. It is natural to say that the same figure represents a rabbit to Jane, but does not represent a duck to her. Plausibly, this is because while she has sub-personal representations of the duck, she has no personal-level ones. Presumably, to know that there is something in need of repression, Jane's cognitive system must at some point recognize that a duck is presented. It must identify the threat. So at some processing stage, Jane must host a sub-personal representation of the duck. The representation is sub-personal because Jane is completely unaware of it. But although it represents the duck, this representation does not represent the duck to Jane. At the same time, some other representation -a personal-level onedoes represent the rabbit to Jane.
Similarly, suppose John suffered a brain lesion, in the wake of which he is unable to recognize ducks (at the personal level). To him too, the figure represents a rabbit but Upon reflection, it is plausible to say that even in the mundane case where I have a visual experience of the duck-rabbit figure, I cannot see it as a duck and as a rabbit simultaneously. Rather, the figure switches back and forth from duck to rabbit. It seems natural to describe this by saying that I undergo a succession of perceptual states that at first represent a duck to me, then represent a rabbit to me, then again represent a duck to me, and so on.
These facts -about Jane's, John's, and my personal-level representations as we look at the duck-rabbit figure -are described very naturally in terms of three-place representations. I am not ruling out that they might also be describable in terms of twoplace representations. But such description is likely to be more cumbersome, incomplete, and less natural. In any case, these remarks are intended as illustration, not argumentation. They illustrate the notion of three-place representation, and how natural it is to use it in describing personal-level representations.
Note well: I am not denying that personal-level representations instantiate the two-place relation that extant theories of mental representation attempt to account for. I am merely insisting that, in addition, they also instantiate a three-place relation.
I now wish to make further claim, however. It is that unless a representation instantiates this three-place relation, it does not qualify as personal. That is, it is a necessary condition on personal-level representations that they represent to the person whose representations they are. The argument turns on the previous section's awareness approach to the personal/sub-personal distinction.
Recall that the distinguishing mark of personal-level states is that their subject is aware of them. This awareness of a representational state might be thought to secure the state's representing what it does to the subject who is aware of it. To a first approximation, then, the argument might be formulated as follows:
For any person P, representational state S, and content C, such that (i) P has S and (ii)
1) S is a personal-level representation only if P is aware of S;
2) If P is aware of S, then S represents C to P; therefore,
3) S is a personal-level representation only if S represents C to P.
The problem in this formulation is with Premise 2. If P is aware of S, but unaware that S represents C, then P's awareness of S would do nothing to secure S's representation of C to P.
This obstacle can be overcome, however, if we claim that personal-level representations must be transparent or diaphanous in the sense in which perceptual experiences, as well as beliefs, are often -and in my view, justifiably -said to be. 25 In the relevant sense, for a representation to be transparent is for it to be such that one can only be aware of it by being aware of its content. This principle would justify the proposition that P cannot be aware of S unless P is aware of S's representing C, or of C's being the content of S. This in turn is equivalent to the proposition that, if P is aware of S, then P is aware of S's representing C. This proposition plugs the whole in the argument and enables the following reformulation:
1) S is a personal-level representation only if P is aware of S;
2) If P is aware of S, then P is aware of S's representing C; therefore,
3) S is a personal-level representation only if P is aware of S's representing C;
4) If P is aware of S's representing C, then S represents C to P; therefore,
5) S is a personal-level representation only if S represents C to P.
Premise 2 here is guaranteed by the transparency of personal-level representations.
Premise 1 is the result of the previous section's discussion. And Premise 4 sounds more or less like a conceptual truth.
The conclusion of this argument undercuts the ontological tenet of the mental representation orthodoxy. Recall that the tenet was formulated, minimally, as follows:
If this is supposed to apply to personal-level representations as much as sub-personal
representations, then we might introduce that fact explicitly:
(2Pd) x is a veridical personal-level mental representation if (i) there is a y, such that (ii) x bears the appropriate relation R to y.
(2Pd) clashes with the conclusion (5) of the above argument. That conclusion entails the following:
(3P) x is a veridical personal-level mental representation only if (i) there is a y, and (α) there is a z, such that (ii) x bears the appropriate relation R 1 to y, and (β) x bears the appropriate relation R 2 to z.
(2Pd) claims that clauses (i) and (ii) are a sufficient condition for x's being a (veridical) personal-level mental representation. But (3P) denies that: it claims that (α) and (β) are also necessary, so that any combination of conditions that did not include (α) and (β) would be insufficient. Dretske's point is well taken, but the claim I am pressing here is not meant to apply to all representations, only to personal-level ones. Rings on a tree represent, but not to the tree. They do not constitute personal-level representations. For personal-level representation, instantiation of the three-place representation relation is necessary.
3.2.The Semantic Tenet
With the exception of Ruth Millikan, whose views will be discussed toward the end of this subsection, I am not aware of any other comment by a proponent of extant theories of mental representation that addresses, or even acknowledges, the three-place representation relation. The representation-to component of personal-level representation has thus been a constant blindspot in those theories. To the extent that they do not address it at all, they cannot possibly constitute adequate accounts of it, and therefore of personallevel representation.
It is a separate question, however, whether the orthodoxy has the resources to account for representation-to. Even if no explicit attempt has been made to account for representation-to in informational, teleological, and/or functional terms, it may still be thought that it should be fairly easy to do so once one tries. In this subsection, I will examine some tempting avenues and indicate initial difficulties. I do not argue that extant theories categorically lack the resources to account for representation-to. I only wish to argue that it is not entirely obvious that they do not: it is not straightforward how the informational and teleological tools could be beneficially applied to the notion of representation-to. (In any case, it is quite a telling fact that no serious attempt has been made to account for representation-to. It betrays the way in which extant theories have clung tightly to the methodological and ontological tenets of orthodoxy.)
The proponent of the orthodoxy might attempt to deflate the challenge by arguing that representation-to amounts to nothing more than ownership. For a state or feature to represent something to someone is simply for that state or feature to represent what it does and be a state or feature of the relevant "someone." On this account, "x represents y to z" can be analyzed as follows: (i) x represents y and (ii) x occurs in z (or: x "belongs to" z in the relevant sense).
However, this deflationary account is highly implausible. The tree rings (i) represent the tree's age and (ii) are a feature of the tree, but they do not represent the tree's age to the tree. So conditions (i) and (ii) can be fulfilled even when representationto does not occur.
A modified deflationary account might restrict the analysans to persons, so that "x represents y to z" is analyzed as (i) x represents y, (ii) x occurs in z, and (iii) z is a person. The deflationary route is thus unpromising. A proponent of the mental representation orthodoxy would do better to try to accommodate the phenomenon rather than deflate it, using her informational, teleological, and functional tools.
One thought might be to employ some sort of second-order information carriage.
The idea would be to account for representation-to in terms of second-order representation-of (which would be understood in terms of a second-order state that carries information, and has the function of carrying information, in the exact same way that first-order representations-of do). On this proposal, x represents y to z just in case (i) x represents y and (ii) z has a representation of x's representation of y. More explicitly, we might say that x represents y to z iff (i) x represents y and (ii) z has an internal state w, such that w represents x's representation of y.
The problem this informational account of representation-to faces is best brought out by a dilemma. Is w (the representation of x's representation of y) a personal-level representation or a sub-personal representation? Neither answer is satisfactory. The first horn, where w is a personal-level representation, is doubly problematic. First, it launches a regress of personal-level representations. Secondly, it appeals to personal-level representation in accounting for the same, and is to that extent vacuous. The second horn is also problematic, though perhaps less flagrantly so. The main challenge it faces is to account for the appearance that all the components of personal-level representation are at the personal level. Thus it seems that we are minimally aware, rather than completely unaware, of the fact that personal-level representations represent to the person who has them. It is possible that this challenge (and others that may arise) can be met by this horn of the informational approach. But more work must be done to show that this is so.
Another resource in extant theories' toolbox may be teleo-functional. I am thinking in particular of the sort of "consumer semantics" developed initially by Millikan (1984, 1989) and further by Carruthers (1996 Carruthers ( , 2000 . Millikan (1989: 284) writes that a representation "must be one that functions as a sign or representation for the system itself," and proceeds to offer a functional account of this feature of representation. The suggestion is that a key aspect of a representation's functional role is its availability for consumption by certain downstream modules. Perhaps this could be cashed out in terms of availability to an executive control module. Perhaps it would be a matter of global availability to a number of high-profile, high-sophistication modules. But in any case, some such special and/or widespread consumability might account for representation-to.
One might thus suggest that an internal state represents to the subject when it is readily available for use by the subject, and that personal-level representations enjoy heightened or sharpened availability.
This strikes me as the most promising avenue for extant theories to explore. There are nonetheless serious problems with the idea. For one thing, we can readily imagine a state that is available for consumption by any and every module in the subject's cognitive system, while remaining entirely outside the subject's awareness. This would be a subpersonal state that satisfied the consumer semanticist's requirements. It follows that these requirement do not specify a sufficient condition for being a personal-level representation.
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Furthermore, having a certain functional role is a dispositional property, but being a representation-to seems to be an occurrent, hence non-dispositional, property. Thus, for a state to be available to certain modules, it need not actually be availed of by them. But A consumerist account of representation-to might nonetheless be worth exploring.
I cannot say with confidence that, everything said and done, it would fail (or succeed!) to offer a reasonable treatment of the notion. For that matter, the second-order information strategy might be worth exploring as well. Nonetheless it is an illuminating fact about extant theories that the explorations in question remain to be pursued, and have not been attempted with sustained seriousness. That fact by itself casts the current orthodoxy as inadequate and incomplete.
Observe that I have taken pains not to characterize the extant theories as naturalist. This is because although they are, it is not their naturalism that I want to impugn. 32 None of the above undermines naturalism per se. As a naturalist myself, I certainly hope that personal-level representations prove amenable to naturalist treatment.
But deflating the phenomena in order to make them thus amenable could only postpone that achievement. 33 Casting personal-level representations as essentially the same as subpersonal ones, and ignoring their representation-to component, strikes me as an instance of such undue deflation. The consequence is that adequate resources for accounting for representation-to have never been seriously developed within the mental representation orthodoxy.
The Methodological Tenet
In the nature of things, sub-personal representations can be posited only on purely theoretical grounds. We have no reason to believe in their existence apart from the sense their existence would make of observable behavior, that is, apart from their explanatory payoff. Accordingly, the only properties we can ascribe to them are those properties they to remember that of days past, so that they may recognize patterns of warming and cooling, of which they are delighted to construct elementary mathematical models. These creatures have a mental life that is not only narrowly cognitive, but involves also emotion, memory, sensation, inductive reasoning, and more. In the conduct of this rich mental life, they deploy a panoply of mental representations (including, very possibly, sub-personal ones). However, while a weather-watcher has no evidence on which to ascribe sub-personal representations to her conspecifics or even herself, each weatherwatcher has all the evidence she needs to ascribe personal-level representations to herself. Naturally, the evidence in question is first-person evidence.
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The claim I am making is straightforward: we do not posit personal-level representations solely for theoretical reasons. If anything, we would need theoretical reasons to unposit, if you please, personal-level representations. After all, the initial appearances are that they do exist. These appearances are not incontrovertible and selfawareness is notoriously fallible. All the same, the initial appearance that a personal-level representation exists does provide initial, prima facie, and de tanto evidence that it does.
The evidence is defeasible, but no less evidence for that. Until defeated, such evidence would remain the last word on the subject.
There is a crucial disanalogy here with sub-personal representations. With respect to the latter, the initial appearances are that they do not exist -which is why theoretical considerations are needed to posit them. In any event, the evidential force of initial appearances is the same in the personal and sub-personal cases, but the appearance itself is different in each case: in the personal case, the initial appearance is of existence; in the sub-personal case, it is of non-existence.
I cannot stress enough that none of this presupposes heady Cartesian assumptions about infallibility, or for that matter the slightest special authority or privileged access.
The only presuppositions operative in these considerations are, first, that there is such a thing as first-person evidence, and second, that it is distinct from third-person evidence. At the risk of seeming to overlabor the point, let me stress again that this is not to say that every fleeting impression we might have of a property of a personal-level representation provides equal warrant, let alone absolute or incontrovertible warrant, for ascription of the property in question. In fact, we could even insist that it is never justified to ascribe to a personal-level representation a property that is explanatorily detrimental, that is, a property that undermines the representation's explanatory efficacy -even if the ascription of such a property is strongly suggested by first-person appearances. This would not only deny special authority to the first-person perspective, it would actually grant such authority to the third-person perspective. But this still allows that, with a personal-level representation, property ascription could be warranted even when it is not third-personally mandated, namely if it is first-personally encouraged. The result would be the following methodological principle:
(M) For some representation R and property F, if R seems to be F (firstpersonally), and ascription of F to R is not explanatorily detrimental (third-personally), then one is justified in ascribing F to R.
Thus whereas with sub-personal representations, any ascription of a property that is not explanatorily useful is entirely groundless, in the case of personal-level representations it may not be.
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Principle (M) allows us to see why a first-person-friendly approach to mental representation can be responsibly adopted, without falling into familiar Cartesian pitfalls.
The approach would merely insist that, if I have a strong and stable first-person impression that my personal-level visual representations of kind K instantiate property F, then in some circumstances I might be justified in saying that they do -even if saying so contributes nothing to their explanatory dexterity. This is not the case with sub-personal representations. To them it is warranted to ascribe only those properties that contribute toward the satisfactory performance of the explanatory job they were posited to perform. is not (merely) a two-place relation holding between a representor and a represented, but (also) a three-place relation between a representor, a represented, and a represented-to.
Contrary to the semantic tenet, it is not obvious that all components of this three-place relation could be equally well handled by a suitably augmented information-theoretic apparatus, and if they could be, that they should. Contrary to the methodological tenet, personal-level representations are not posited on purely theoretical, third-personal grounds, but also on experiential, first-personal grounds.
In some sense, the above critique, even if accepted wholesale, would not expose a It would be seriously disconcerting if our theory lacked the resources to account for any paradigmatic mental representation. This would be the case if only personal-level representations were paradigmatic (so that no sub-personal ones were). This strikes me as not at all implausible, inasmuch as our pre-theoretic conception of mental representation is grounded in our ongoing stream of conscious occurrent thoughts and experiences and their representational character.
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A parallel point applies to the philosophical notion of intentionality. It is plausible to suppose that this notion derives from our personal-level representations, not from subpersonal ones. This might justify a preliminary suspicion that, to the extent that we seek in the theory of mental representation a solution to the traditional philosophical problem of intentionality, the solution is more likely to emanate from the theory of personal-level representation than from that of sub-personal representation.
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I suspect there may be many more implications of clearly distinguishing personallevel representation. Thus, someone might hold, for whatever reason, that while content externalism is correct with regard to sub-personal representations, it is false of personallevel ones. Someone else might claim that Stich-style eliminativism and Dennett-style instrumentalism (Stich 1978 , 1983 , Dennett 1987 , however well motivated with respect to sub-personal representations, defy credulity when it comes to personal-level representations. And so and so forth.
I am not going to pursue all these implications here. For that matter, the above remarks are already rather sketchy. I do not wish to establish or assert here any particular thesis regarding these wider issues. I am only concerned to underline the significance of the previous section's critique. If that critique of the mental representation orthodoxy is at all on the right track, then there may well be important consequences for some of the deepest, most "perennial-looking" philosophical issues surrounding mental representation. 4 It is usually further supposed that the relevant theory would provide a solution to the problem of intentionality -that is, that it would constitute a correct account of intentionality.
5 I speak of relations in this context even though it is well known that representation, or at least intentionality if it is a relation at all, would have to be a very unusual relation, in that it can hold even when not all of its relata exist. Some have, quite justifiably, refused on these grounds to call intentionality, or representation, a relation, claiming that a relation cannot be instantiated when the relata do not exist. But this would only require me to rephrase the way I express the point in the text. We could introduce the notion of a "relation*," which is something just like a relation except that it does not require the existence of the "relata*." More simply, we can focus on veridical representation, which is certainly a relation. This issue will be taken up momentarily in the text.
6 I use "hallucinatory misrepresentation" to denote misrepresentation of an entity that does not even exist, not just one that has different properties than the one it is represented to have. The term "targetless misrepresentation" is also sometimes used to denote the same. 7 The methodological assumption is often explicitly embraced, perhaps most notably by Fodor (1975) and Cummins (1989) . 8 The reader will have noticed that I did not include in this list short-armed versions of conceptual or functional role semantics, such as Field's (1977), Loar's (1981), Block's (1986) , and Brandom's (1994) . This is mostly because the phrase "functional role semantics" is something an oxymoron: functional role is a matter of relations among mental states, whereas semantics are concerned with relations to (typically) extra-mental entities. Once this point is ignored, certain perversions are introduced into the theory of mental representation that should be immaterial to the main argument of this paper. 9 The mental representation orthodoxy, although hugely dominant in the literature, has not gone entirely unchallenged. Various parts of it have been questioned, or straightforwardly rejected, by such writers as McGinn (1988) , Searle (1991 Searle ( , 1992 , Strawson (1994 , 2005 ), Horst (1996 , Horgan and Tienson (2002 ), Loar (2002 ), Georgalis (2006 ), and Kriegel (2003 , 2010 . My own critique will make contact with theirs (especially McGinn's and Georgalis') at different points and in various ways that I will indicate in footnote in the right places. But it is also importantly different from theirs in several key respects, most manifestly in focusing on the personal/sub-personal. 10 Nor is Dennett particularly clear on how to draw the distinction more precisely.
11 An immediate objection might target the construal of persons as systems. One has, not is, a cognitive system. It is quite implausible to identify me with my global cognitive system. But instead of assuming, problematically, that there is an identity relation between persons and global cognitive systems, the proponent of the systemic approach can assume, more plausibly, that there is a constitution relation between them. Thus, I am not a global cognitive system, but I may well be constituted by one.
25 Since Harman's (1990) defense of the transparency thesis for perceptual experiences, the thesis has become extremely popular. I defend it in Kriegel 2002 and 2009. 26 The thought, then, is something like this. There are traces in my brain that represent an external condition C in the same impersonal way that traces in the snow represent a thief's escape path even when nobody is aware of their existence. But such traces in my brain form a sub-personal representation of C precisely because I am unaware of them. In order for the representation of C to be personal, I would have to become aware of it, and once I do, the representation would represent C to me.
27 These remarks are also in line with some of Colin McGinn's and Nicholas Georgalis' work on the difference between conscious and non-conscious representation (see McGinn 1988 , Georgalis 2006 . Their views can be harmlessly transplanted, perhaps with added plausibility, to the difference between personallevel and sub-personal representation. McGinn's claim, for instance, would be that personal-level representation is two-faced, whereas sub-personal representation is single-faced. Personal-level representations are Janus-headed, or two-faced, in that they involve the representational content's "presence to the subject." Compare a veridical personal-level and a veridical sub-personal (e.g., subliminal) perceptual representation of a red object (or surface or volume). The sub-personal representation involves only a relation between the representational state and the red object. The personal-level representation involves this relation as well, but it also involves, on top of that, a relation between the representational state and the subject. In such a personal-level representation of a red object, the relation between the representing state and the represented object is what McGinn calls the outward-looking face of the representation's content, while the relation between the representing state and the represented-to subject is its inward-looking face. The sub-personal representation has the very same outward-looking face, but lacks the inward-looking face. The latter is unique to personal-level representation.
28 At least this is so if we stipulate that, throughout his life, Jim remains unaware that his goosebumps constitute the natural sign they do. 29 The same holds for tacit beliefs. Tacitus believed that 1374.67 is greater than 873.92. His belief (i) represented the fact that 1374.67>873.92 and (ii) occurred in Tacitus, and (iii) Tacitus was a conscious and sentient creature. Yet the belief did not represent the fact that 1374.67>873.92 to Tacitus in any nontechnical sense. At least this is so if we stipulate that, throughout his life, Tacitus never became aware of this tacit belief. Searle (1992) claims that tacit beliefs could not be anything but brute neurophysiological states. If so, Tacitus' tacit belief is no different from his goosebumps. Unconscious brain states and skin states are exactly the same in the respect. 30 In other words, a consumer-semantical account of representation-to returns wrong results.
31 Two points about this paragraph. First, I am working here with an intuitive, unregimented notion of disposition, because delving into the metaphysics of dispositions, their manifestations, and their categorical bases would take us too far afield. Second, it might be objected that if my reasoning was correct, it would afflict functional role accounts of representation-of. My response is that indeed I think (and always have) that it does. Functional role semanticists assume that a representation acquires its representational content in virtue of its functional role. But this quite obviously puts the cart before the horse. More plausibly, a representation acquires the functional role it does precisely because of the representational content it has.
32 I am referring here to ontological naturalism -roughly, the view that there are no supernatural entities or phenomena -not the sort of epistemological naturalism based on the idea of methodological continuity between philosophy and the sciences. What I have said may well be consistent with such epistemological naturalism as well (depending on just how it is formulated, it may or may not be consistent with my rejection of the methodological tenet of orthodoxy), but in any case it is not in the epistemological sense that extant theories are referred to as naturalist. 33 Nonetheless, it may well be that the adherence to naturalism of extant theories of representation is part of what has led them astray (if I am right that they were led astray), in that it may have encouraged deflating the phenomena to ensure that they do not elude the naturalist framework. 34 There are important questions regarding what it means to encounter a representation, or be presented with it, in one's experience. Although I will make passing remarks on this issue, I will leave it largely open-ended, mostly because I do not wish to commit to anything that might becloud the overall point. The overall point of my discussion in this section should be neutral on just what it means to encounter a representation in one's experience, and I want it to remain such. 35 This is in line with the transparency of phenomenal experience mentioned in the discussion of the ontological tenet. 36 Moreover, a medieval peasant would have all the reason I have to believe that she is has a mental representation when she is aware of having one. This, despite the fact that she may have no theoretical beliefs about an alleged sub-personal mental life.
37 This is not quite right, actually. There may be instances of mental behavior (such as calculating or deliberating) whose explanation calls for the positing of sub-personal mechanisms employing sub-personal representations. Since the weather-watchers could "observe" some of their personal-level mental behavior, they might have grounds on which to posit the sub-personal representations needed to explain them. This makes the weather-watchers an imperfect illustration of the point that grounds for admitting personal-level representations are categorically different from grounds for admitting sub-personal representations. Perhaps the following modification would do, however. Let weather-epiwatchers be creatures weather-watchers whose mental states are virtually epiphenomenal, except that they do yield states of introspective awareness of them (in case the relation between a mental state and its introspecting is causal). Weather-epiwatchers cannot engage in mental behavior any more than in bodily behavior, since their mental states do not cause anything. Therefore, they have no grounds on which to posit sub-personal representations. Yet they have all the grounds they need for admitting their own personal-level representations.
38 Although the issues here are complicated, it is possible that the presuppositions are even more innocuous than that, and shares much with ordinary perceptual experience. When I look out the window, I see a tree. I believe that the tree exists. Importantly, I do not believe that the tree exists because the supposition that it does is explanatorily useful to me. I believe that it exists because I see it. Theoretical and explanatory considerations may well convince me that it does not in fact exist. But until they do, I believe that the tree exists and believe so simply because the tree is present to me. It is possible that nothing more mysterious is involved in our awareness of personal-level representations. It is not because the supposition that my representation of my laptop exists explains something otherwise inexplicable that I believe the representation exists. I believe that it exists because I am aware of it -in the same way I believe that the tree exists because I see it. (Some might insist that I posit the tree as an explanation of my tree experiences. The tree is posited as the thing that is causally responsible for my having the experiences I do. This strikes me as false to the facts, but even if it were conceded, a similar story could be told about my awareness of my laptop experience. The laptop representation would be conceived as a posit necessary to account for my awareness of the laptop representation. It is still the case that this sort of evidentiary relation is different from others, and characterizes first-person evidence exclusively.) 39 This principle could also be thought of as applying with equal force to sub-personal representations, but in the nature of things, sub-personal representations never seem first-personally to have any properties. 40 In rejecting the methodological tenet of orthodoxy, I join most notably Nicholas Georgalis (2006), who has argued thoroughly and repeatedly against it. 41 It may be objected that we do not have a pre-theoretic conception of mental representation. But this seems to me to be false. We do not pre-theoretically use the term "mental representation" (or at least do not
